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P 291859Z NOV 82
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5609
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6785
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 8803
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
BT
S E C R E T GENEVA 11818

WB W
file: Sen. Pell
SFR

EXOIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ROSTOW; SHAPE/FOR GEN ROGERS AND POLAD

USSTART

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, START

SUBJECT: (U) START: VISIT BY SENATOR PELL NOVEM-
BER 26 1982

1. THIS IS START II-064. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT HIS REQUEST I BRIEFED SENATOR PELL ON THE CURRENT
STATUS OF OUR START NEGOTIATION. SENATOR PELL SAID HE
FAVORED THE FREEZE AND WAS AGAINST THE PRODUCTION AND
DEPLOYMENT OF MX. HE WAS GENERALLY CRITICAL OF ADMINIS-
TRATION POLICIES ON ARMS CONTROL AND WEAPONS PROCURE-
MENT. ROWNY
END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

State Dept. review completed

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FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4586
INFO RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN GER
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
ZEN/AMCONSUL BARCELONA POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL BILBAO POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL SEVILLE POUCH
BT
C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 12108
MILITARY FOR POLADS

E.O. 12356: DECL 11/26/88

TAGS: PINT, SP

SUBJECT: POPULAR ALLIANCE LEADER TELLS CODEL MATHIAS
THE EMERGENCE OF TWO LARGE PARTIES IN SPAIN
A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. IN NOV 22 MEETING WITH CODEL MATHIAS AND
AMBASSADOR, POPULAR ALLIANCE (AP) PARTY PRESIDENT CLAIMED
THAT THE OCT 28 ELECTIONS HAD BROUGHT SPAIN ESSENTIALLY
A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM, SIMILAR TO THE BRITISH MODEL, IN
WHICH SMALL PARTIES COULD BE POTENTIAL COALITION PARTNERS.
HE THOUGHT THAT THIS DEVELOPMENT WAS ONE OF THE STABILIZ-
ING FACTORS FOR SPAIN, THE OTHER MAJOR ONE BEING THE
MODERATING ROLE OF THE KING. HE THOUGHT THAT THE NEW
SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE TO STAY IN POWER FOR
ONLY TWO YEARS. FRAGA REPEATED HIS PARTY'S STRONG
SUPPORT FOR SPANISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. END SUMMARY.

3. FRAGA MAINTAINED THAT THE EVOLUTION OF SPAIN TOWARD
TWO LARGE PARTIES WAS POSITIVE. IT INCREASED THE BASIC
STABILITY OF THE COUNTRY. THE OTHER MAJOR FORCE FOR
STABILITY WAS THE MODERATING ROLE OF THE MONARCHY. THE
PRESENT SITUATION IN SPAIN IS MUCH DIFFERENT FROM THAT
WHICH PREVAILED BEFORE THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR WHEN
BIPOLARIZATION BROUGHT DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES. NOW,
FRAGA SAID, A SPIRIT OF COEXISTENCE AMONG THE PARTIES
HAD DEVELOPED, AND HE NOTED THAT WHILE THE ELECTORAL
CAMPAIGN HAD BEEN STRONGLY CONTESTED IT WAS RELATIVELY
FREE FROM DRAMATIC CONFRONTATIONS AMONG THE LEADERS OF
THE POLITICAL PARTIES. HE COMPARED SPAIN'S PRESENT
SITUATION TO THAT OF GREAT BRITAIN, IN WHICH HE HAD
SERVED AS AMBASSADOR. HE EXPECTED THE TWO LARGE
PARTIES, THE POPULAR ALLIANCE AND THE SOCIALIST PARTIES,
TO DOMINATE THE POLITICAL SCENE WITH A SCATTERING OF
SMALL AND REGIONAL PARTIES CONTINUING TO EXIST AND TO
PROVIDE POSSIBLE COALITIONS IF NECESSARY.

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4. FRAGA WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC THAT THE UNION OF THE DEMOCRATIC CENTER (UCD) PARTY WOULD BE ABLE TO RECUPERATE FROM ITS ELECTORAL DEFEAT AND SEVERAL YEARS OF INFIGHTING. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE BROAD RANGE OF CONSERVATIVES IN SPAIN HAD LONG BEEN GROUPED INTO THREE MAJOR CURRENTS: THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, WHO THEMSELVES SPLIT INTO SEVERAL SMALLER FACTIONS; THE LIBERALS, A SMALL BUT IMPORTANT PART OF THE CONSERVATIVE BLOC; AND THE CONSERVATIVES WHO BELIEVED IN PROGRESS BUT ALSO IN THE MAINTENANCE OF THOSE VALUES THAT HAD PROVED USEFUL IN THE PAST. THESE CURRENTS, HE ADDED, WERE ALL JOINED TOGETHER IN THE UNION OF THE DEMOCRATIC CENTER, AND IT HAD NOT BEEN SURPRISING THAT SERIOUS STRAINS HAD DEVELOPED WITHIN THE PARTY. THE USEFUL VOTE, THE VOTE GIVEN TO THE PARTY THOUGHT TO HAVE THE BEST CHANCE TO MAKE AN IMPACT, HAD GONE IN THE PREVIOUS TWO ELECTIONS TO THE UCD BUT IN 1982, WITH THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE UCD, IT HAD GONE TO THE POPULAR ALLIANCE. FRAGA GAVE EVERY INDICATION THAT HE EXPECTED THE USEFUL VOTE THE ON THE CENTER-RIGHT AND RIGHT TO STAY WITH THE AP.

5. THE COMMUNIST PARTY, HE CLAIMED, HAD ALSO BEEN SIDELINED. HE BLAMED THE DROP IN COMMUNIST STRENGTH, FROM 23 TO 4 DEPUTIES, ON THE LEADERSHIP OF COMMUNIST SECGEN SANTIAGO CARRILLO. CARRILLO, A CIVIL WAR HOLDOVER, HAD BROUGHT THE COMMUNISTS TO THEIR PRESENT LAMENTABLE STATE BY HIS POLICIES, WHICH DID NOT REFLECT WHAT THE SPANISH PEOPLE WANTED, AND BY HIS IRON-HANDED CONTROL OF THE PARTY.

6. FRAGA EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY CLAIMED THAT THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT NOW TAKING POWER MIGHT LAST 18 MONTHS, BUT HE NOW SAID HE HAD REVISED HIS PREDICTION OF LIFE EXPECTANCY OF A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT TO TWO YEARS OR SO. (COMMENT: FRAGA DID NOT EXPLAIN HOW HE EXPECTED THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT TO FALL. END COMMENT.) ASKED TO EXPLAIN WHY THE SOCIALISTS HOLD SOME OF THEIR POSITIONS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, E.G., NATO, AND HOW THE USG COULD BEST DEAL WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT, FRAGA DIPLOMATICALLY SIDESTEPED DIRECT ANSWERS, SAYING THAT THESE QUESTIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, HE RAN THROUGH A SERIES OF HYPOTHESES OF HOW THE SOCIALISTS MIGHT HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR PRESENT

ATTITUDE TOWARD SPANISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, ALWAYS PREFACING HIS SPECULATION WITH "SOME SAY THAT." THE HYPOTHESES WERE: EXPERIENCES DURING THE YOUTH OF SOCIALIST LEADER FELIPE GONZALEZ (UNSPECIFIED); AN AGREEMENT BY GONZALEZ DURING A TRIP TO MOSCOW (AN ALLUSION TO THE 1977 JOINT COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH THE SOCIALIST PARTY AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO EXPANSION OF MILITARY BLOCs); AND REMNANTS OF THE MARXISM WHICH THE PARTY CLAIMED IT HAD DROPPED AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN 1977. FRAGA REITERATED HIS PARTY'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR SPANISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO AND STATED THAT HE DOUBTED THAT THE SOCIALISTS, ONCE IN POWER, WOULD EVER HOLD THE REFERENDUM THEY HAD PROMISED ON SPANISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.

7. COMMENT. FRAGA'S DISCUSSION WAS GENERAL, BUT HE GAVE EVERY INDICATION THAT HE PLANNED TO LEAD A LOYAL, NOT A DISRUPTIVE, OPPOSITION AND THAT HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT HIS PARTY WOULD CONTINUE TO GROW. TODMAN
END OF MESSAGE

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